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Noah W. Collins 
Abstract 
Philosophical pragmatism originated in the United States in the late 19th century. 
Some historians of  philosophy have described the history of  American pragmatism in terms 
of  an “eclipse narrative”: dominant in the early 20th century, followed by a mid-century 
decline and, eventually, a late-century resurgence. Defenders of  this narrative often point to 
the influx of  European philosophers around WWII, and the rise of  “analytic” philosophy, as 
the main reasons for pragmatism’s initial eclipse. While the eclipse narrative is common in 
the philosophical literature, it is not without controversy. Unfortunately, the contemporary 
debate tends to rely on anecdotal evidence and contested lines of  influence between 
prominent philosophers. My approach in this thesis is uniquely different. I instead approach 
the history of  pragmatism empirically by using modern bibliometric techniques and using a 
large data set of  papers (nearly 90,000 in all) to track the mentions of salient words 
connected to American pragmatism over several decades. This allows us to determine what 
American philosophers were actually talking about and when they were talking about it. My 
method provides a valuable perspective into a contemporary debate in the history of  
philosophy and, I conclude, is very much in the spirit of  pragmatism itself. 
I. Introduction 
 American pragmatism is a method of  philosophy that focuses on practical results. 
Pragmatism originated in the late 19th century (Menand, 2001): since then, like many 
intellectual movements, it has been more or less prominent, and more or less central to 
ongoing philosophical debates. Some historians of  philosophy have described pragmatism’s 
history in terms of  an “eclipse narrative” (though not all: see Misak, 2013, 2016). This means 
that when pragmatism was first formulated by Peirce, James, and Dewey in the late 
nineteenth century it was widely viewed as a serious way of  doing philosophy. However, the 
story goes, after World War II and with the influx of  European philosophers into American 
universities, pragmatism was “eclipsed” by newly dominant forms of  European philosophy. 
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At the time this would have primarily been the logical positivism and logical empiricism 
inspired by the work of  Russell, the early Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and other early 
proponents of  “analytic” philosophy (Frost-Arnold, 2017). Many decades later pragmatism 
was then un-eclipsed thanks to work of  “neopragmatists” who revitalized the pragmatic 
method by reinterpreting and updating Peirce, James, and Dewey’s distinctive approach to 
philosophical problems. 
 The eclipse narrative, while common in the philosophical literature (Rorty 1982, 
Kitcher 2012), is not without controversy (Misak 2013, 2016). Some historians of  philosophy 
have argued that it fails to accurately describe what happened to pragmatism after WWII and 
how (or even if) it rebounded in the late twentieth century. Unfortunately, the contemporary 
debate tends to depend on anecdotal evidence and contested lines of  influence between 
prominent philosophers. These methods serve to emphasize important pragmatist, and may 
miss some nuances. These interpretations of  history may be biased; they may not. My main 
issue with these methods is the interpretations of  history allow for many narratives which 
makes progress minimal. 
My approach in this thesis will be different. I propose that empirical methods can be 
used to reveal when and whether there was intellectual influence. Rather than analyzing the history 
by reading books and papers, and then distilling this into a narrative, I will instead approach 
the history of  pragmatism empirically by using modern bibliometric techniques. For this 
thesis I collected a large data set of  papers (nearly 90,000 in all) from JSTOR, which I then 
used to track the mentions of  salient words connected to American pragmatism over 136 
years. This gives a picture of  how words were actually used and whose name was mentioned. 
It allows us to see what philosophers were actually talking about and when they were talking 
about it. Not only does this provide a valuable perspective into a contemporary debate in the 
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history of  philosophy, but I would argue that this empirical method is very much in the spirit 
of  pragmatism itself.  
II. Pragmatism 
 In order to understand the controversy over whether or not pragmatism was eclipsed 
and when, it’s important to say something about what pragmatism is and how it entered 
academic philosophy. This is because the debate about pragmatism’s eclipse is, at least in 
part, a debate about whether distinctively pragmatic ideas continue to be philosophically 
relevant in the 21st century. And the answer to that question depends on how pragmatism 
itself  is understood. 
Charles Sanders Peirce 
 Pragmatism can be traced to the writings of  Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). 
Peirce worked in many fields including logic, linguistics, chemistry, and mathematics. During 
his life he held only one official teaching position, at John Hopkins University from 
1879-1884. To survive financially he worked primarily at the U. S. Coast and Geodetic 
Survey, where he specialized in measuring the earth’s gravitational field. Perhaps it is because 
of  his work in these practical fields that Peirce developed pragmatism.  
For Peirce pragmatism was a philosophy that defined the meaning of  concepts in 
terms of  the practical effects it has. Take for example the concept of  truth. For Peirce, to 
understand truth we need not look to an abstract conception of  truth; rather we should look 
at the practical effects truth has on us. It is through our use of  and interaction with the 
concept of  truth that it becomes a clear concept in our minds. Unlike other philosophical 
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approaches which locate meaning “in the head,” Peirce places meaning out in the world, 
where it is a function of  how we interact with the concept in question. As Peirce writes: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, 
we conceive the object of  our conception to have. Then, our 
conception of  these effects is the whole of  our conception of  the 
object. (Peirce 1878, 8) 
 This for Peirce is what it means to understand something or for a concept to have 
meaning. The concept must in some way have a practical effect for us: once we identify the 
practical effects then we’ve identified the meaning. Take again, for instance, Peirce’s example 
of  hardness. For Peirce “the whole conception of  this quality (hardness), as for every other, 
lies in its conceived effects.” That is, for us to even conceive of  an object as hard we need to 
have some awareness of  that object’s effects; we need to have dealt with something hard in 
our lives. As Peirce writes in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878): 
We may, in the present case, modify our question, and ask what 
prevents us from saying that all hard bodies remain perfectly soft 
until they are touched, when their hardness increases with the 
pressure until they are scratched. Reflection will show that the reply is 
this: there would be no falsity in such modes of  speech. They would 
involve a modification of  our present usage of  speech with regard to 
the words hard and soft, but not of  their meanings. (Peirce 1878, 9). 
For Peirce meaning did not exist in the abstract: it was something formed through our real-
world interactions with concepts and with the objects embodying those concepts. This is a 
pragmatic theory of  meaning and it arguably lies at the heart of  what became known as 
American pragmatism. It’s fair to say, then, that Peirce’s two main contributions to 
pragmatism are 1) he first proposed a pragmatic account of  meaning, and 2) he laid the 
foundation upon which future pragmatists such as James and Dewey would build. 
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William James 
 At a young age, William James (1842-1910) developed an interest in painting and 
science. While his family jumped back and forth between America and Europe, James 
likewise hopped between studying the sciences and the arts. James, much like Peirce, did not 
confine himself  to philosophy. James’ work also spans the fields of  physiology and 
psychology. In 1890 he published his master work on psychology: The Principles of  Psychology.  
 One of  James’ many contributions to pragmatism was his work on the pragmatic 
theory of  truth. While Peirce also developed a pragmatic account of  truth—roughly, that 
true beliefs are those that will stand up to indefinite scrutiny—James focused especially on 
what truth means to the pragmatist. Typically, we may take a statement p to be true when it is 
in accordance with reality. Take for example a statement like “Joe Biden won the race for 
President of  the United States.” Initially, we might say that this is true because it is in 
accordance with the facts: for example, the fact that Joe Biden got more Electoral College 
votes than Donald Trump. That is, there is an accordance between the statement about 
Biden winning and his actual winning of  electoral college votes. However, recall that, 
according to Peirce, meaning is use. James then asks us to consider the meaning of  truth by 
considering how we use this concept. James’s answer is that a proposition is true when we 
find it dependable and action-worthy. In Pragmatism (1907) James writes: 
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and 
verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the practical 
difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the 
meaning of  truth, for it is all that truth is known-as. (James 1907, 
Lecture VI) 
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Here there is evidently no appeal to some stagnant ideal of  a proposition. A true proposition 
is, as James says, one that we can assimilate and validate: the emphasis is on the person 
holding the belief, and not on reality; a true belief  is useful because it is useful to us. For 
example, we validate the earlier statement by looking at the Electoral College votes for the 
2020 presidential election.  
 Due to James’ success popularizing pragmatism, within a few years we also begin to 
see critiques. Recall that for James a proposition is true when it is “assimilated, validated, 
corroborated and verified.” Another way James expresses this is that “we cannot reject any 
hypothesis if  consequences useful to life flow from it” (James, 1907). This would appear to 
mean that, if  we take some proposition p and we can benefit from p in some way, then we 
must conclude that p is true. Bertrand Russell later had some choice words to say about this. 
He writes: 
James’s doctrine is an attempt to build a superstructure of  belief  
upon a foundation of  skepticism, and like all such attempts it is 
dependent on fallacies. [It is] a form of  the subjectivistic madness 
which is characteristic of  most modern philosophy. (Russell, 1945) 
Russell’s critique of  James’ pragmatism seems to be pointing at a foundational issue. For 
Russell pragmatism is built atop a base of  inappropriate skepticism, and so rests on fallacies. 
Pragmatism, unlike Russell’s philosophy, deals with the effects of  a belief  which tells us 
whether it is true or false. This is contrary to Russell’s philosophy which—like many kinds 
of  empiricism—deals with the causes of  a belief. It is this shifting of  perspective that sets 
pragmatism apart from other methods of  philosophy before it, and it was a continuing 
reason for pragmatism to receive attention (both positive and negative) through the middle 
of  the twentieth century. 
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John Dewey 
 Next in the pragmatic lineage is John Dewey (1859-1952). Dewey, like Peirce and 
James, worked across a wide range of  fields spanning political and educational theory, ethics, 
epistemology, metaphysics and logic. To understand what Dewey added to pragmatism we 
first need to recall what James and Peirce did.  
Misak and Talisse suggest that the heart of  the difference between James and Peirce 
is their opposing interpretation of  what Misak and Talisse call “the pragmatic maxim,” or the 
central goal of  pragmatist philosophy (2019). For Peirce the maxim was a way to purge 
nonsense from philosophy so that we could focus, instead, on what we can and need to 
answer. James, on the other hand, treated the pragmatic maxim as a way for us to clarify and 
answer those questions that Peirce would have cast aside.  
 Dewey, however, disagreed with both James and Peirce. He saw pragmatism not just 
as way to ascertain the meaning of  (useful) metaphysical notions, nor as a way to drill down 
to what was really true. For Dewey pragmatism was the best—and perhaps only—way of  
doing philosophy in a scientific, post-Darwinian age. He thought that many previous 
philosophical problems were a result of  misguided metaphysical systems and, since they had 
no bearing on real-world problems, should be completely abandoned. As Misak and Talisse 
point out again:  
Dewey contended that, since these conditions no longer obtain, the 
traditional philosophical problems should be simply abandoned as 
‘chaff,’ replaced by new difficulties arising from Darwinian science. In 
Dewey’s view, Darwinism shows that the world contains no fixed 
essences or immutable natures. The realization sets the problems of  
revising our philosophical and moral ideas so that they are better 
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suited to serve as tools for directing change. According to Dewey, the 
leading philosophical problem for a post-Darwin epoch is that of  
keeping our values in step with our technological power, so that they 
might guide society towards greater freedom (Misak and Talisse, 
2019). 
 Thus, for Dewey pragmatism is not a just a method for making our ideas clear, nor is 
is it just a way to settle our metaphysical arguments. As Misak and Talisse point out the 
problem for philosophy is how exactly we keep our values in line with rapid technological 
developments.  
 From this it can be seen how pragmatism went through many stages as it progressed 
from a novel proposal to a well-established theory. It began as a theory of  meaning 
formulated by Peirce to weed out senseless metaphysical disputes: in short, a method for 
helping us become clear on what we mean. Then, with James, pragmatism’s theory of  truth 
was developed further. Unlike Peirce, James saw many metaphysical disputes as ones that 
should be resolved—not merely dismissed—and that pragmatism was the way to resolve 
them. Lastly, we have Dewey, who disagreed with both Peirce and James and, under the 
influence of  Darwin, claimed that many previous philosophical methods were invalid. 
According to Dewey, we should simply opt out of  previous metaphysical disputes.  
Pragmatism after Dewey 
 By the early and mid-part of  the 20th century, it would seem self-evident that 
pragmatism was on the upswing. The main years that Peirce, James, and Dewey were 
publishing was from the early 1900’s to the 1940’s.  However, this rise in popularity would 
not last. In Pragmatism Endures Misak and Talisse quote Rorty who said: 
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Along about 1945, American philosophers were, for better or worse, 
bored with Dewey, and thus with pragmatism. They were sick of  
being told that pragmatism was the philosophy of  American 
democracy, that Dewey was the great American intellectual figure of  
their century, and the like. They wanted something new, something 
they could get their philosophical teeth into. What showed up, thanks 
to Hitler and various other historical contingencies, was logical 
empiricism, an early version of  what we now call ‘analytic 
philosophy’. (Misak and Talisse, 2019) 
Rorty is claiming that, by the end of  WWII, the pragmatism of  Dewey, James, and Peirce 
was old news, and American philosophers were ready to move on to a new set of  
approaches. Rorty claims that these new ideas came in the form of  logical positivist theories 
of  truth, knowledge, and meaning that had been developed in Berlin and Vienna before the 
outbreak of  World War II and that became central to philosophy in the United States due to 
immigration from Germany, Austria, and Poland. This, finally, brings us to the “eclipse 
narrative.”  
III. The “Eclipse Narrative” 
 Historians and philosophers disagree on pragmatism’s trajectory after Peirce, James, 
and Dewey. As mentioned earlier, one common account is the “eclipse narrative.” Before 
discussing the eclipse narrative, it will first help to describe what supposedly eclipsed 
pragmatism: logical positivism (or “analytic” philosophy in general). Like pragmatism, logical 
positivism was scientifically oriented, empirically minded, and generally supportive of  liberal 
political positions. Major thinkers associated with logical positivism and early analytic 
philosophy include Rudolf  Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, and 
many others. The eclipse narrative says that due to an influx of  positivist philosophers into 
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American universities around WWII, American philosophy eventually turned away from 
pragmatism and sided with the competing theories of  freshly arrived positivist philosophers. 
As Misak and Talisee write in “Pragmatism Endures” (2019): 
In other words, [Rorty’s] popular ‘eclipse narrative’ (as we’ll call it) 
holds that pragmatism dominated professional philosophy in 
America throughout Dewey’s heyday, from the early 1900s until the 
early ’40s. Then, largely due to the war in Europe and the resulting 
influx of  academics to the US, professional philosophy in the US 
took a ‘linguistic turn’ and began fixating on the technical and 
methodological issues that today are associated with ‘analytic 
philosophy’, a tradition originating in the work of  Gottlob Frege in 
Germany; Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein in 
England; and Rudolf  Carnap and Moritz Schlick in Austria. (Misak & 
Talisse, 2019) 
 While other factors may have contributed to the supposed eclipse of  pragmatism, 
this theory is that its eclipse was primarily the result of  the freshly arrived positivist thinkers 
who had a general disdain for pragmatism. Thus, most defenders of  the eclipse narrative 
point to logical positivism, logical empiricism and what became known as “analytic” 
philosophy as the schools of  thought that eclipsed pragmatism in the 1930s and 1940s. This 
interpretation would also be supported by the excerpts from Russell cited above: Russell, 
obviously, was a champion of  positivism and a major figure in early analytic philosophy. 
IV. Neopragmatism and the Re-emergence of  Pragmatism 
 The eclipse narrative has a flip-side. After all, eclipses are temporary, not permanent, 
phenomena. According to many proponents of  the eclipse narrative, even though 
pragmatism was eclipsed around WWII, it did eventually reemerge into the philosophical 
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spotlight. According to Rorty’s own version of  the eclipse narrative, there was eventually a 
rebirth of  pragmatism in America following the positivist influx. The new brand of  
pragmatism that came to fruition in the 1970s and ‘80s has been termed “neopragmatism” 
and is closely associated with Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Cornel West and others (Rorty 1982, 
Putnam 1992, West 1989). While these thinkers did revitalize interest in pragmatism, their 
work did not come without criticism.  
 Some have argued that neopragmatism is too analytic and insufficiently pragmatic. 
What this means is that while there is a pragmatic undertone to what the neopragmatists 
were doing, they were not sufficiently faithful to the original. Think of  this as when a 
popular comic or book is adapted into a film, and the fans of  the source material complain 
that the movie skipped some scenes. Because of  neopragmatism’s perceived unfaithfulness 
to pragmatism’s origins, some have argued that pragmatism has remained eclipsed. That is, 
because neopragmatism is not faithful to the source material, there was actually never a 
rebirth of  pragmatism but just a change of  who was doing the eclipsing.  
 Others disagree with the eclipse narrative for different reasons, holding that 
pragmatism was never big enough to be eclipsed in the first place. Those who hold this 
position would say that the work of  Peirce, James, and Dewey was never sufficiently 
dominant in American philosophy departments. Therefore, when the logical positivists came 
to America, there was nothing for them to eclipse: they merely set up shop.  
 Given this disagreement over pragmatism’s trajectory—was it eclipsed and, if  so, 
how and to what extent? I hope to provide some evidence that will make a unique 
contribution to addressing this question. As Talisse says in his review of  Misak’s Cambridge 
Pragmatism: if we are to believe the eclipse narrative then “there has to be a neglect of  or a 
refusal to engage with pragmatism on the part of  the ‘analytic’ philosophers” (Talisse, 2016). 
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That is, if  the eclipse narrative is true then we should see a lack of  engagement with 
pragmatism in the years preceding and following WWII. Hence the purpose of  my analysis: 
if  we can find evidence of  interaction and uptake, then the eclipse narrative does not give 
the correct view of  pragmatism’s trajectory, and we should revise our  
understanding of  the history of  20th century American philosophy accordingly.  
V. Methods 
To address the question of  whether and to what degree pragmatism was “eclipsed” in the 
post-WWII era, I undertook a bibliometric analysis of  over 90690 articles published in nine 
prominent philosophy journals between 1890 and 2016. In contrast with previous work that 
relies on anecdote or first-person recollections of  that period, my empirical approach has the 






Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 7,809 1941-2016
The Journal of  Philosophy 19,640 1904-2014
Mind 11,030 1876-2014
The Philosophical Review 11,961 1892-2014
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8,018 1940-2014
Philosophy of  Science 5,903 1934-2015
The Review of  Metaphysics 9,422 1947-2016
Synthese 7,201 1936-2016
Table 1: Selected journals with counts and year span
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fared in the scholarly literature. It also allows for a comparative analysis between pragmatism 
and other contemporaneous philosophical movements.  
 I performed this analysis by gathering a dataset from JSTOR that pulled all journal 
articles published from the set of  target journals. JSTOR’s data sets contain two types of  
files: n-grams and metadata files. N-gram files count how many times a word or name 
appears in a paper. It is from these files that I extracted the number of  papers where a given 
word or name appears. The metadata file contains XML files. These are files which have a 
tree structure that contains publishing information about each paper and which allow me to 
get a count of  how many papers were published each year. 
 To perform this analysis, I first defined a “mention.” I define a “mention” as a given 
word or name w appearing in a paper at least once. This definition of  “mention” is neutral. 
That is, it does not distinguish between positive or negative mentions of  w. Take for example 
the name “Dewey.” My method counts a negative mention such as this:  
Statements like these above have worried critics and supporters of  
Dewey’s theory. In an early review of  Dewey’s aesthetics Eliseo Vivas 
charged Dewey with being inconsistent. One cannot appear to assert 
and yet deny that art has emotion for its content, he argued. In a 
recent commentary on Dewey's aesthetics Philip M. Zeltner notes 
that “Dewey is at his obfuscating best in his discussion of  emotion,” 
and indeed, “appears to be equivocal in his use of  the term ‘emotion.’ 
(Whitehouse 1978) 
And it also counts a positive mention such as this:  
And Dewey embodied the pragmatic commitment to unifying theory 
and practice. He was a tireless public intellectual whose activities ran 
the gamut from marching in support of  women’s suffrage to helping 
to found the NAACP to presiding over the Trotsky trial in Mexico. It 
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is with good reason, then, that contemporary philosophers who are 
most keen to ally themselves with this “classical” pragmatist 
movement tend to idolize Dewey. (Aikin and Talisse, 2011) 
It could also be the case that a mention is neither positive or negative.  
 I define “mention” in a neutral way because I am interested in looking at a word or 
name’s currency, not its reputation. If  w is in circulation in the set of  journals selected, then 
it follows that it is a topic with some level of  familiarity and interest among philosophers.  
 To see whether mentions of  a particular word w were trending upwards, downwards, 
or neutral over time, I used Matlab’s “ischange” function. This is a numeric method which 
creates a trend line for a given data set, where abrupt shifts in the data change the slope of  
the trend line based on these shifts. For example, if  there is not much variation in mentions 
then the trend line would stay flat, but if  mentions were increasing or decreasing over a 
certain time span then there will be a positive or negative slope to the associated trend line.  
 I chose the journals in Table 1 based primarily on longevity: each of  the journals has 
a several-decade long track record. This allowed me to track mentions over a longer period 
and source papers from a consistent set of  representative journals. In addition, I chose these 
journals because they are either generalist (covering a range of  philosophical topics) or 
because they are leading journals in a specific subfield. For example, The Journal of  Philosophy 
publishes articles on a wide range of  topics including epistemology, ethics, philosophy of  
language, and political theory. Including it (as well as other generalist journals such as Mind 
and The Philosophical Review) ensures that I was able to compare mentions of  target words and 
names against mentions of  other widely (and not-so-widely) used philosophical terms. Other 
more specialized journals, such as Ethics and Philosophy of  Science, were chosen to ensure that I 
covered important philosophical subfields that might otherwise be underrepresented by 
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focusing solely on generalist journals. By selecting generalist journals, I also have the ability 
to see how other philosophical approaches tracked over time in comparison to pragmatism. 
This allows me to compare pragmatism’s trajectory with other philosophical approaches. If  
mentions of  pragmatism decline, but so do mentions of  other approaches, this may have 
less to do with pragmatism specifically and more to do with philosophy becoming more 
crowded with new approaches. 
 I chose the date range of  1890-2016 not only because it captured the earliest 
publishing dates for all the selected journals but also because it captures the period when 
pragmatism began to play a key role in academic philosophy, through its “eclipse” by other 
theories, and up through the emergence of  neo-pragmatism.  
VI. Results 
 The ultimate goal of  my analysis is to see if  there is a correlation between a) how 
frequently a word or name is mentioned over my selected time period and b) how 
philosophers and historians of  philosophy describe this same period. As stated before, one 
dominant view of  the history of  pragmatism is the eclipse narrative. The story asserts that, 
with the influx of  positivist thinkers into American universities post-WWII, there was a turn 
away from pragmatism and the pragmatic method in academic philosophy. However, once 
again we must keep in mind that for the eclipse narrative to be a valid description of  the 
history of  pragmatism, there should be a noticeable disengagement with pragmatism and its 
thinkers in the post WWII era. There is however a second, alternative, narrative.  
 This second narrative asserts that when the positivists came to America post-WWII, 
they came to a country that was already primed and ready for their views. On this 
interpretation, pragmatism had already prepared the ground for logical positivism by 
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developing positions that were at least adjacent to those arriving from Europe. This would 
mean that rather than pragmatism being eclipsed, pragmatists and positivists were able to 
make common cause. Cheryl Misak offers a version of  this narrative: her view is that rather 
than an eclipse of  pragmatism, positivism and pragmatism commingled in the same pond. 
(Misak also makes much larger claims as to what pragmatism is, but these go beyond the scope 
of  this thesis). Misak also notes that many of  the most prominent analytic philosophers who 
succeeded Peirce, James, and Dewey were either pragmatist (in some sense at least: e.g., 
Lewis, Rorty, Quine, Goodman and Putnam), fans of  pragmatism (Ramsey, possibly 
Wittgenstein), or at the very least interacted with them at some point (Ayer, Carnap, and 
Chisholm, e.g.).  
 Figures 1 and 2 give us a picture of  what was happening in the dataset and whether it 
corresponds to either of  the narratives described above. Based on Figures 1 and 2 there is a 
large spike in mentions of  “pragmatism” around 1908 and 1909 when papers containing at 
least one mention of  pragmatism make up 23% of  all papers published in these years. This 
is what we would expect, given that James’ Pragmatism was published in 1907 and The Meaning 
of  Truth was published in 1909, both providing pragmatism with an obvious jolt of  publicity. 
However, starting in the 1920s, we see the beginning of  a general downward trend of  
mentions of  “pragmatism” extending until the late 20th century. While we do see a 
resurgence of  mentions in 2000 (when papers with at least one mention of  pragmatism 
make up 9% of  all papers published), this surge is short lived, and mentions continued to 
trend downward.  
 It’s not a surprise that we see a downward trend after an initial spike of  interest: like 
any other phenomena we’d expect a flurry of  interest followed by sagging attention as time 
goes on. However, as Figure 1 shows, this is not a steep decline to little to no mentions. 
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Even after Jame’s death in 1910 pragmatism was still very much part of  the philosophical 
conversation. This is likely due to the fact that Dewey was entering one of  his most fertile 
periods, with the publication of  Democracy and Education (1916), Reconstruction in Philosophy 
(1919), Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature (1925), The Public and Its 
Problems (1927), and The Quest for Certainty (1929), among many other books and articles that 
appeared in the 1910s and 1920s. In addition, Peirce’s Collected Papers, edited by Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, also began to appear (Volume 1 was published in 1931 and 
Volume 5 (Pragmatism and Pragmaticism) was published in 1934).  
 We then see another spike in mentions in the last few decades of  the 20th century. 
This is probably due to the emergence of  neopragmatists such as Richard Rorty, Hilary 
Putnam, Richard Bernstein and others (Rorty 1990, Putnam 1995, Bernstein 2010).  
 Despite this, if  we focus solely on Figure 1 we find that while pragmatism was 
mentioned in 23% of  all papers in 1908, by 1940 pragmatism was mentioned in only 8% of  
all papers published in the selected journals. From 1940-1960 the percentage declines even 
more, with papers mentioning “pragmatism” making up only 3% of  the papers published in 
these journals. This suggests a notable decrease in number of  mentions of  pragmatism and 
would seem to support the eclipse narrative. 
 However, “pragmatism” is not the only word that is of  importance. If  we also look 
at the names of  prominent pragmatist philosophers, we will gain a more nuanced picture. 
For example, I also tracked mentions of  “Dewey.” Since Dewey largely avoided the term 
“pragmatism”—opting instead to go with “instrumentalism”—this will catch uptake of  his 
work that, while thoroughly pragmatic in spirit and in substance, would not contain an 
explicit mention of  “pragmatism.” Even though Dewey preferred to describe his position as 
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a kind of  “instrumentalism” he is recognized as one of  the most important pragmatist 
philosophers (Maddux 2015, Quirk 2000). 
 If  Rorty’s narrative is correct (again, that “along about 1945, American philosophers 
were, for better or worse, bored with Dewey, and thus with pragmatism”) then there should 
be low mentions of  “Dewey” in the years preceding the positivist arrival in America. 
Looking at Figures 3 and 4 it appears that Rorty’s narrative fails to capture the actual history. 
Instead of  a decrease in interest in Dewey, Figures 3 and 4 show the highest number of  
mentions of  “Dewey” in the entire dataset from 1940-1950. In fact, at the time when 
philosophers were supposedly “bored” with Dewey there were 174 papers that mentioned 
him in 1950 alone—or 17% of  all papers published that year.  
 Perhaps there is something strange or anomalous about this spike in 1950. Dewey 
was still active even in that year (he died in 1952 at age 92). In 1949 he published his final 
book Knowing and the Known, and was continuing to publish in journals (e.g., “Experience and 
Existence: A Comment” (1949) in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research). One interesting 
fact about Dewey is that he continued to be mentioned across a wide swath of  journals, 
including those that had taken a more “analytic” turn. (This idea comes from Katzav and 
Vaesen (2017).) As Table 1 notes, 7,809 papers from The Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
are included in my data set. Dewey published Art as Experience in 1934 and looking at JSTOR 
we can see many papers that tackle Dewey’s aesthetics. Despite this, there is still a decrease in 
mentions of  “Dewey” after the influx of  positivist thinkers. So, while this might agree with 
Rorty's claim that American philosophers were “bored” with Dewey, it’s not clear that this 
boredom was the reason Dewey was mentioned less; in any case, the decline in Dewey 
mentions seems to have come in the late 1940s and early 1950s, not with the end of  WWII 
as Rorty suggests. While this is perhaps only a minor shift in the narrative it does help paint 
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a more accurate picture of  what philosophers were writing about during the post-WWII 
period.  
 With regards to neopragmatism, we should also look at Rorty to see how his unique 
version of  pragmatism fared in the post-Dewey era. The reason I chose to look at “Rorty” 
rather than “neopragmatism” is that Rorty was closely tied to the neopragmatist movement, 
and so using his name (like using “Dewey” as a proxy for “pragmatism”) will give a more 
nuanced picture of  what was taking place. From Figures 5 and 6 we can see that from 1980 
up to the late 1990's there is an increase in mentions of  Rorty. This may give us some 
indication that while James’ and Dewey’s pragmatism may have been eclipsed by analytic 
philosophy in the 1950s, Rorty’s neopragmatism represented a genuine resurgence.  
 However, at the same time, it cannot be forgotten that neopragmatism also spurred 
renewed interest in the first generation of  American pragmatists: Peirce, James, and Dewey. 
Philosophers and historians often discovered that the neo-pragmatist appropriation of  
classical pragmatism was selective and partial. Meanwhile, philosophers and historians who 
had kept the pragmatist light burning through the lean years of  the 1950s-1970s resented 
those whose first exposure to pragmatism came via neopragmatism. As Misak and Talisee 
note, “the resurrection [of  pragmatism] is tinged with resentment.” The idea here is that the 
neopragmatism of  Rorty, Putnam, and West is too analytic for many traditional pragmatists. 
Due to what some view as a crude appropriation of  pragmatism by neopragmatists, there 
was significant work being done by scholars of  classical pragmatism to reintroduce 
philosophers to Dewey’s brand of  pragmatism. 
 We might also ask whether, after the initial influx of  positivism in the 1940’s, there 
was a decline in interaction with positivist ideas. This led me to track the mentions of  
positivist terms to see if  Rorty’s eclipse narrative accurately captures the history. If  Rorty is 
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correct, then we should see that names and terms associated with positivism have higher 
mentions than names and terms associated with pragmatism.  
 Figures 7 and 8 show how mentions of  “positivism” have ebbed and flowed over 
time. As expected there is a massive spike in mentions from 1940-1950, but after this it falls 
off. From 1940-1960 papers with mentions of  “positivism” make up 8% of  all papers. And 
in 1951 it reaches a maximum with 14% of  papers in my dataset containing at least one 
mention of  “positivism.” Interestingly, in 1951, 163 papers in my data set mentioned Dewey 
(18% of  all papers from this year); and so, in that year, Dewey was mentioned more 
frequently than positivism. It’s also noteworthy that by the 1960s “positivism” mentions 
were falling. By 1996 mentions of  “positivism” made up only 4% of  all papers in my dataset.  
 In “On the Emergence of  American Analytic Philosophy” Katzav and Vaesen point 
out that from from 1930-48 The Philosophical Review published papers from a variety of  
traditions drawing on a variety of  philosophical methods. However, they discovered that 
around 1948 there was a shift to a more analytic style and content. From 1950-1955 around 
65% of  papers published in The Philosophical Review were on analytic philosophy (Katzav and 
Vaesen, 2017). What this shows is that the large spike in mentions of  positivism in the 1950s 
could in part be due to this shift in the editorial scope of  The Philosophical Review and its sway 
with other journals. After this spike, however, there is still a drop in mentions of  positivism. 
 The decline in mentions of  positivism could also be related to the fact that over time 
positivists stopped calling themselves by that name and began calling themselves empiricists 
and analytic philosophers instead. Another possible reason could be related to changes in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical position. Wittgenstein is one the most important figures in 20th 
century analytic philosophy, and while at the beginning of  his philosophical career in the 
1920s he was aligned with positivism, his later works (such as On Certainty (composed before 
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his death in 1951 but published in 1969) and Philosophical Investigations (1953)) have a much 
more pragmatic character (Haack 1982). That is, the later Wittgenstein rejected the positivist 
project, and leaned more towards a pragmatic mode of  philosophy (though, as Haack points 
out, it is a mistake to call Wittgenstein a pragmatist). More accurate would be to say that he 
agreed with a large part of  pragmatism’s tenets but still had disagreements with their ideas.  
We might surmise that, just as Wittgenstein’s views shifted from positivism to pragmatism, 
so too did the views of  others, either independently or as a direct response to Wittgenstein’s 
influence.  
 Misak argues for a different view of  the history of  pragmatism in both The American 
Pragmatists (2013) and Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein 
(2016). Misak claims out that there was actually no eclipse of  pragmatism, but rather that 
when positivism came to the United States it found a receptive philosophical landscape. If  
this were the case, then there should be little to no decline in mentions of  pragmatism and 
pragmatism-adjacent terms in the data set. 
As we’ve seen this is indeed the case for “Dewey.” From 1950-1960 papers with at 
least one mention of  “Dewey” made up 15% of  all papers published in the dataset. Also, 
during this time, papers with at least one mention of  “pragmatism" made up 7% of  all 
papers. Looking then at “positivism,” papers with at least one mention of  “positivism” made 
up for 8% of  all papers in the dataset. Just as we looked at mentions of  “Dewey” to gain a 
more nuanced understanding of  pragmatism, we can look at mentions of  specific positivists 
and early analytical philosophers to gain a more refined understanding of  positivism. If  we 
look at mentions of  “Russell” over the years of  1950-1960 we find that Russell, like Dewey, 
was mentioned in 15% of  all papers published in these years. This may suggest that 
philosophers are more likely to mention other philosophers by name than to mention the 
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corresponding school of  thought. But this also suggests that there may not have been an 
eclipse of  pragmatism at all: if  there had been an eclipse we would expect to see a marked 
decrease in interaction with pragmatism and pragmatic adjacent terms (such as “Dewey”). 
Given that mentions of  “Dewey” and “Russell” are roughly the same during the immediate 
post-WWII period, this would suggest that the eclipse narrative misrepresents the actual 
history. 
VII. Conclusion  
 The history of  pragmatism is often described as an eclipse: a homegrown philosophy 
overshadowed by the influx of  positivism around WWII. In addition, as we’ve seen, 
pragmatism is itself  a contested term: its founders did not all agree on a common meaning, 
and such disagreements have continued until the present time among pragmatists, 
neopragmatists, and “new” pragmatists. But, despite all of  this, pragmatism had a resurgence 
in the post-positivist era since the late 1970s and is, today, a topic of  serious philosophical 
consideration. 
 Granted, if  only mentions of  “pragmatism” are counted then there would be reason 
to believe the eclipse narrative. In the post-WWII period only 3% of  articles mention 
“pragmatism”: this is much less than either “positivism” or “Russell” during that time 
period. But the number of  mentions of  “Dewey” during this period demonstrates that many 
philosophers were still interacting with pragmatist ideas. It would be a mistake, as a result, to 
whole-heartedly commit to Rorty’s version of  the eclipse narrative. And that would suggest 
that we should look more deeply and more carefully into how thinkers in both the positivist 
camp and the pragmatic camp interacted with each other. Misak and others point out that, 
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like positivism, pragmatism was a type of  empiricism. Hence when positivism came to the 
United States it was arriving in a country already deeply committed to empirical approaches. 
Misak also notes the effect that the mathematician and philosopher Frank Ramsey had on 
the future direction of  analytic philosophy (in part by turning Wittgenstein in a more 
pragmatic direction)—and Ramsey was, perhaps surprisingly, deeply influenced by Peirce 
(Misak, 2016).  
 Thus, as is usually the case in history, the picture becomes more complicated. But the 
analysis done here would suggest that the eclipse narrative does not capture the full picture 
of  American philosophy in the 20th century. My analysis also shows that a bibliometric 
approach to the history of  philosophy allows us to gain a clearer picture, and when 
combined with traditional historical analysis, offers a deeper understanding and appreciation 
of  the history of  American pragmatism.  
  Collins:   A Bibliometric Analysis23
 
Figure 1: Graph of “pragmatism” mentions over time with linear change line.
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Figure 2: Graph of “pragmatism” mentions over time.
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Figure 3: Graph of "Dewey" mentions over time with a linear change line.
 
Figure 4:Graph of "Dewey" mentions over time.
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Figure 5: Graph of “Rorty” mentions over time with linear change line.
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Figure 6: Graph of “Rorty” mentions over time.
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Figure 7: Graph of “Positivism” mentions over time with linear change line.
 
Figure 8: Graph of “Positivism” mentions over time.
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